Assad after Palmyra

The recapture by the Syrian army of the historic city of Palmyra last week marked an important turning point in the five-year conflict that has destroyed much of the country, killed hundreds of thousands and displaced millions.

It was the first major battle between regime forces, backed by Russian air cover, and Daesh militants who had taken the city almost a year ago.

Almost a week later, the Syrian army declared victory over Daesh in the neighbouring town of Qaryatain, enabling the regime to control oil and gas supplies in the area, and giving it a foothold near the Iraqi border for the first time in years.

The next stop for government forces will be Deir Ezzor, in eastern Syria, and from there, hopefully, to Raqqa, the self-proclaimed capital of Daesh.

These recent victories have bolstered the regime’s stand as the only force on the ground that is capable of defeating Daesh. 

It, along with forces of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), will eventually cut off Raqqa from all sides before storming it.

Such a likely scenario will go a long way in boosting President Bashar Assad’s position as the only person who could unite the country, end the civil war and oversee a future transitional phase.

Such developments have altered the strategic views of many players in the Syrian conflict.

The Syrian opposition expressed concern over the ambiguity of the American position on the future of Assad, whose departure remains a key demand.

The Russians, who wield major influence over the regime and appear to have convinced the Americans of their own version of a political solution in Syria, insist that the fate of the Syrian president can only be decided by the Syrian people.

Assad, who rejects the formation of a transitional ruling body, opting instead for a national unity government, now appears ready to hold an early presidential election.

With a discredited opposition in exile and in the absence of a unifying political figure inside, his chances of winning will be huge. Yet, this is one scenario that the opposition and its allies will reject.

While the Geneva process stalls, developments on the ground will determine the final outcome of negotiations.

The opposition was handed a 12-point document by UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura last month, none of which mentions the future of Assad.

Important as it is, since it refers to the Geneva communiqué and Security Council Resolution 2254, the document provides a base for possible face-to-face negotiations later this month.

No wonder that the opposition is suspicious and pessimistic about the outcome of the Geneva process.

Moscow has managed to convince the Americans that defeating Daesh and not replacing Assad is the number one priority in Syria for now.

It was also able to cast doubts over the credentials of the Syrian opposition. It now wants Syria’s Kurds to be included in the Geneva talks and suggested that a federal system may be the best arrangement for a united and stable Syria for all of its components.

There is no doubt that the coalition of opposition groups has some fundamental flaws. These problems will emerge if and when the negotiators begin to write a new constitution for Syria as a democratic and secular state.

It is not unlikely that some opposition groups with Islamist affiliations will have issues with such definitions.

Both Moscow and Assad are aware that these differences will surface sooner than later. Such challenges will test the resolve of the opposition’s key regional allies, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

It is likely that the Russians will pressure Assad to give the local opposition, which the regime describes as nationalist, more leeway to move and become active.

The endgame will be to arrange for free legislative and presidential elections, under UN and international supervision, and allow all to compete on merit.

There is no reason, from a Russian point of view at least, why Assad cannot run again. For Moscow, this is something for the Syrian people to decide.

Meanwhile, the UN will focus its efforts on extending the shaky truce for as long as possible. That is going to be difficult since the regime violated it a number of times recently.

But with little military support from its allies coming through, the opposition is in no mood to engage in new fighting.

There are good reasons to believe that the Syrian advance against Daesh positions will be successful.

The PYD, which enjoys Russian and American backing, has been effective in fighting the militant group. And with Russian air cover, the Syrian army, using the truce to its favour, has been able to regroup and build new momentum.

The political process in Geneva will almost certainly be on hold or move slowly as parties await the outcome of military developments on the ground.

The writer is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.