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Hamas must do more to become politically relevant

May 09,2017 - Last updated at May 09,2017

Politics, it has been said, is the art of the possible, but when it comes to the decades-old Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it can also become the art of the absurd!

In a prosaic repetition of history, Hamas, the 30-year-old Gaza-based Islamic Resistance Movement, took the decision to amend its charter, releasing a political document of principles that basically severs ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and accepts a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital, without recognising Israel.

Outgoing head of the movement’s Political Bureau, Khaled Mishaal, said in Doha last week that while the new document does not abandon the “constants” of Palestinian rights, it reflected Hamas’ ability to evolve in light of changing political realities.

The contrast between the PLO’s own evolution from the 1970s onwards and Hamas’ apparent shift towards moderation cannot be ignored.

Under its historic leader, Yasser Arafat, the PLO underwent a slow departure from the principles of armed liberation of Palestine and destruction of Israel — etched in its Palestine National Charter — towards the adoption of UN Security Council resolutions, the creation of a Palestinian state on the 1967 borderlines and finally the recognition of Israel.

In return, Arafat’s PLO gained international acceptance, particularly by the Americans, which eventually led to direct negotiations with Israel and the signing of the Oslo agreements.

Hamas was born in Gaza during the first Palestinian Intifada of 1987. It presented itself as an alternative to the secular PLO; an umbrella of various Palestinian national liberation movements.

It immediately became a major rival of Fateh’s, the largest Palestinian faction, building grassroots support among conservatives, mainly in Gaza but also in the West Bank.

It identified ideologically with the Muslim Brotherhood and believed fundamentally in armed struggle and the destruction of Israel. Its military wing, Al Qassam Brigades, became a key player following the Oslo deal, which Hamas had rejected, when it waged a series of suicide attacks inside Israel during the 1990s.

That prompted direct Israeli reaction in the form of lethal air strikes on Gaza and the assassination of political and military leaders of Hamas, including the movement’s founder Ahmad Yassin.

Hamas’ role in undermining Oslo and eventually Arafat’s position remains central to the widening rift between the Islamist movement and the Palestinian Authority.

Even before its forced takeover of Gaza Strip in 2007 and the ousting of the PA, Hamas had engaged in provocative acts against Israel, which led to the first major Israeli operation against the besieged strip in 2006.

Two other major offensives took place in 2008 and 2014, all resulting in massive civilian deaths and injuries, and the destruction of Gaza’s precarious infrastructure.

Despite Israel’s indiscriminate use of munitions, some of them banned under international law, in the heavily populated strip, it was never made accountable for its crimes.

Major world powers leaned towards Israel and condemned Hamas’ firing of rockets on Israeli towns and settlements.

The movement’s ideological platform became a political straightjacket, as the Israeli blockade remained intact and its key sponsors, Turkey, Qatar and Iran, could do little to end its isolation and irrelevance.

It took Mishaal and key leaders years to wake up to the new geopolitical reality, post Arab Spring, that their fundamentalist course was leading them nowhere.

Their iron grip over the impoverished strip made them unpopular.

Their strategic relationship with Egypt waned following the toppling of Mohamed Morsi in 2013.

Ties to Tehran became a liability following the latter’s sectarian interventions in Syria and Iraq.

Hamas’ refusal to hand back power to the PA in Gaza derailed numerous attempts to restore Palestinian unity.

So now it claims to embrace pragmatism and offer a vague compromise that was quickly rebuffed by Israel and belittled by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

Actually, the Hamas document raises more questions than gives answers, and does little to bridge the gap between Gaza City and Ramallah.

It was also rejected by Al Jihad Al Islami, Hamas’ rival and ally in Gaza, and with no takers in Israel, one wonders who it is really directed at.

The departure from the Muslim Brotherhood may remove one big hurdle in relations with Cairo.

Egypt controls the only non-Israeli land crossing to the strip and its opening is vital for the livelihood of almost two million stranded Gazans.

But while the Hamas shift, late and surreal in many ways, is a good thing in general, it will hardly change the grim reality of the Israeli blockade on Gaza and its effect on the lives of Palestinians.

Instead of making an inchoate compromise that falls short of what the International Quartet demanded, the new leadership, under Ismail Hanyyieh, should launch a credible initiative to mend fences with the PA and restore Palestinian unity.

Lack of unity has weakened the Palestinians and compromised Abbas at
a time when US President Donald Trump is getting ready to intervene and force a controversial deal.

Hamas needs to change its actions and not only its rhetoric if it wants to achieve political rehabilitation, but most importantly, it must become part of the mainstream political structure to be recognised as a relevant player.

 

 

The writer is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.

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