Iran’s agenda threatened by Astana process

Those who had hoped that the proposed peace talks on Syria, which opened in the Kazakh capital on Monday, would stumble at the last minute may feel miffed.

They include a desperate Damascus regime, its main backer Iran and a number of hard-line rebel groups.

The two-day talks, co-sponsored by Moscow and Ankara, represent a serious attempt to seek a political settlement to the six-year bloody war in Syria; one that has claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands, displaced millions and left more than one-third of the country in ruins.

On the other hand, the convening of the Astana talks, in the presence of a regime delegation and another representing most rebel groups, is a major political victory for the evolving Russian-Turkish alliance.

The meeting will seek to bolster last month’s fragile ceasefire and approve a series of agreements to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid especially to besieged areas.

Behind this accelerating process stand Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin.

He has now emerged as the main power broker in Syria, having intervened militarily more than a year ago to rescue the regime of President Bashar Assad but realising as well that an open-ended civil war is no longer an option.

For Iran, which has dispatched tens of thousands of its Revolutionary Guard, backed by Hizbollah, in addition to Shiite fighters from Iraq and Afghanistan, the stakes in Syria are too high to let go.

Tehran’s support for the regime exceeds the declared objectives of backing legitimacy, fighting terrorism and liberating the entire Syrian territory.

It is an integral part of a sectarian scheme that seeks to extend Tehran’s influence over much of Iraq and Syria, altering demographic realities there and securing permanent presence in both.

Moscow’s intervention in Syria and the subsequent control by Russia of the Syrian dossier threaten such plans.

Furthermore, Turkey’s recent breakthrough as a sponsor and guarantor of the military truce in Syria is a major source of concern for Tehran’s ardent rulers.

Ankara’s close relationship with, and influence over, rebel groups is an essential component in the Russian-Turkish understanding on Syria.

Both have important cards to play in moving towards a final political settlement that will eventually allow the Syrian people to decide their own destiny.

In the long run, both capitals believe that once a transitional phase has begun, in accordance with Geneva I principles and UN resolutions, particularly resolution 2254, Assad’s role will have to be negotiated at some stage.

This is something that Tehran will not accept.

President Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have more in common today, in terms of their regional outlook, than do Russia and Iran.

The latter remains a pariah state with mounting evidence that it has become a destabilising force in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and the Arabian Gulf.

The incoming US administration is openly hostile towards Tehran, while President Donald Trump will seek closer cooperation with Moscow and Ankara mainly to confront Daesh.

He is unlikely to challenge Moscow’s political efforts in Astana and beyond.

On the other hand, the Syrian opposition is beginning to understand the changing geopolitical realties in the region and will seek to re-evaluate its position on various issues in order to remain relevant and stay engaged in the political process.

It now views Russia’s role as a positive one, with the head of the Syrian opposition delegation claiming that Moscow is trying to play a neutral role in Astana.

Those who abandon the talks risk being cast as terrorist groups.

For Putin, Russia’s strategic objectives following its incursion have mostly been met.

Moscow now has significant naval and air bases in Syria.

Furthermore, America’s untidy withdrawal from the region under president Obama has allowed Russia to become a major regional player.

It maintains good working relations with Gulf countries, in addition to Egypt Jordan and Israel.

Putin is even pushing for a new role in war-torn Libya, and Moscow is attempting to mediate between Palestinian factions.

Russia’s resurgence is bound to clash with Iran’s regional ambitions, particularly in Syria.

The two agendas will collide sooner rather than later.

But Tehran can still sabotage the budding political process in Syria.

Its power over the Assad regime remains considerable.

President Assad must now decide if he wants to turn his country into a client state for Iran, with its sinister agenda, or embark on a long and arduous path towards a peaceful and all inclusive settlement.

Both sides, the regime and the opposition, will have to be encouraged to make meaningful and even painful compromises if they want an end to the bloodbath in Syria.

This is where the Russian-Turkish mediation becomes especially important, as the two warring sides succumb to exhaustion after six gruelling years.

Astana is but a small step forward in a long and unpredictable journey in search of a workable political settlement in Syria.

It is a complicated process, especially as some rebel groups refuse to join while Turkey insists on excluding Syria’s Kurds, but what is encouraging is that both Moscow and Ankara appear adamant on preserving the current ceasefire and blocking a return to military confrontations.

Iran may not be pleased with the Russian-Turkish attempt to launch a political process, but it can do little to stop it — for now.

The writer is a journalist and a political commentator based in Amman.