US, Assad and Syria

The sudden shift in US position on the fate of Bashar Assad, enunciated last week by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, should not come as a shock to various players and interlocutors in Syria and Geneva.

Even before his victory in the November presidential election, Donald Trump made several references to the outlines of his policy on Syria.

His priority, he said, was to defeat “Islamist terrorists” and not to convince Assad to leave.

He had hoped to work with the Russians towards achieving a common goal in Syria.

In his view, Assad was fighting Daesh, and in that sense, he was more of an ally than a foe.

In reality, the contrast between the Obama and Trump administrations on Assad, Daesh and the Syrian opposition is nuanced.

President Barack Obama’s promise to use force against the Assad regime in the summer of 2013, which was quickly retracted, was the only sign of a proactive action on America’s side against the beleaguered Syrian president.

From that moment on, the US policy on Syria was that of passive engagement: knee-jerk reaction, mostly verbal, to regime atrocities, slapping sanctions on key government figures and providing intermittent military support to so-called moderate opposition.

On Assad’s fate, Washington insisted that he must go and that he cannot play a role in the future of Syria.

And when Russia intervened militarily in September 2015, the Obama administration stepped back and watched as its key allies, namely Turkey, the Europeans and Gulf countries, were left to chart their own plans on Syria.

But Obama was clear on one thing: finding ways to roll back Daesh’s expansion in Syria and Iraq.

He supported the Syrian Kurds, which he believed were a reliable force that would take Raqqa, and increased US military presence in Iraq.

The Syrian opposition was too divided and disconnected to be trusted.

This is where Trump stepped in. While his immediate objectives in Syria are not dissimilar to Obama’s, he has no problem boosting the numbers of US forces in Syria, especially in the northeast, in order to provide logistical support to the Syrian Democratic Forces/Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) fighters in their final assault on Raqqa.

Regarding the Syrian opposition, Trump remains unenthusiastic and his administration is believed to have halted all military support to moderate rebel groups on the ground.

He now appears to be planning for a long-term military presence in northern Syria, and his troops are preparing the recently liberated Tabaka airfield to be their base.

He is also peddling a vague proposal to create several “stabilisation zones” inside Syria to allow refugees to return. The legality of this remains in question.

Despite Trump’s apparent indifference to Assad’s fate, something that must irk his Turkish and Gulf allies, his vow to limit Iran’s influence in Syria and Iraq will act as counterbalance.

Tehran’s growing role and presence in Syria is a serious concern to Syria’s neighbours such as Jordan, Turkey and Israel.

Russia too sees Iranian-backed militias in Syria as a destabilising force that threatens the territorial integrity of the country and its multiethnic mixture.

For Moscow, Trump’s intervention in Syria presents both challenges and opportunities.

His about-face on Assad will please the Russians, but America’s real objectives in Syria will keep the Kremlin guessing.

Still, coordination on Syria could provide the key to a wider US-Russian entente on other issues.

Russia’s main interests in Syria are secured: a permanent military and naval presence in what is often described as “useful Syria”: the region stretching from Damascus to Latakia via Aleppo, Homs and Hamah.

How such a shift in policy will affect political talks in Geneva remains unknown.

The Syrian opposition will come under pressure as a result of Washington’s new stand on Assad. Launching political transition without him is now a far-fetched goal.

Turkey will be partly satisfied to remain in parts of northern Syria in a bid to prevent the creation of a Kurdish enclave once the Raqqa battle is over. 

Both Moscow and Washington may find ways to tempt Assad away from Iran; a gamble that he must take if he wants to remain in the game.

That leaves rebel groups in a flux where they appear to be losing the support of their traditional patrons.

They now must find common platforms to coalesce and combine their resources in order to remain relevant.

That perhaps explains the coming together of ideologically akin groups, as in the case of Free Syrian Army faction, Al Rahman Legion, and the Levant Liberation Headquarters (LLH), which is dominated by the Levant Conquest Front, formerly Al Qaeda, linked Al Nusra Front.

This coalition has been confronting the Syrian army and Iran-backed militias in Damascus, Hama and Daraa.

The LLH is already the dominant force in Idlib and is presenting itself as a formidable player on the ground. 

For now, it is Washington’s enemy, but that could soon change if the US military attention shifts towards Iran-supported militias, once Daesh is out of the picture.

The writer is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.