First signs of hope

When the Iran nuclear deal was reached a month ago in Vienna, analysts’ accounts went wildly in every possible direction, attaching to it every inconceivable and unthinkable attribution. Predictions went as far as claiming that the two-year-long negotiations had not been limited to the Iranian nuclear programme but also dealt, albeit secretly, with all other regional issues, and that the declared agreement was no more than a framework that also included understandings on resolving other pending issues: Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon-Hizbollah, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Depending on where analysts’ sentiments rested, some dared assert that the US had given up on its Arab allies, shifting instead towards a stronger, more reliable and credible Tehran as a new strategic partner for rearranging the region along totally different lines. They also assumed that in return Iran was prepared to drop its traditional commitments towards the Syrian regime, Hizbollah and Hamas in favour of a more pragmatic approach so that Iranian political and economic potential could be spared in full for domestic benefit.

I argued against such a far-reaching fantasy in a number of discussion gatherings on the Western reconciliation with Iran. My conviction has all along been that the negotiations were strictly focused on the Iranian nuclear programme and nothing else. As such, neither the US and its Western allies, nor Iran, were required, let alone willing, to drop their traditional allies on either side of the Arab political divide. That, I also thought, should be positive, as each side — within a new international climate of political cordiality — would use its influence with its regional clients for a better and more constructive handling of the many troubling issues in our region, except, I insisted, one basic case: the Arab-Israeli conflict (my article published on July 21 in The Jordan Times).

My point, that the Arab Israeli issue would remain outside the scope of possible regional understandings, was rarely met with any approval. In fact, many knowledgeable observers believed it would be the exact opposite, affirming that the Arab-Israeli conflict would be the first to be successfully dealt with after the agreement. Some conspiracy theory fans linked their capricious predictions to fanciful ideas such as expanding the Jordanian borders into Iraq’s “oil rich” Anbar province as well as southern Syria, to be followed by transporting Palestinian refugees from Lebanon to settle permanently in Anbar as part of a comprehensive package for resolving the Palestinian problem once and for all, and also for addressing Jordanian economic difficulties and energy needs. This theory presumes Iranian abandonment of Palestinian resistance organisations in Lebanon and Gaza, which I also very much doubt.

Having recalled that, I still stand by my own thesis that the Iran nuclear deal is likely to prepare the ground for possible settlement of most regional conflicts except the Arab-Israeli one. Already there are promising signs concerning both Yemen and Syria. 

After more than four years of fierce and bloody fighting in Syria, the possibility of settling the conflict militarily remains remote. Not just because the bitter outcome of this endless struggle might end up destroying what is left of Syria and disbanding its entire society, but also because this war has been generating detrimental consequences for the rest of the region with possible permeation worldwide. Daesh, as a strong military force, apart from its evil ideologies, is fast climbing to the top of the concerned powers’ list of urgent matters. Apparently these powers, both regional and international, which have been holding the strings in the Syrian military theatre, are finally convinced that the time has come for ending the brutal war and forging a political settlement. That is the only way to fight the extremist organisations — Daesh in particular — that were provided with the perfect breeding environment due to troubled Syrian and Iraqi politics. It may still be too early to assume that a political settlement is certain but there are promising diplomatic moves as well as valid objective factors indicating progress along such lines.

The same can be said about Yemen, where the coalition of Houthis and the forces of ousted Yemini president Ali Abdullah Saleh seem to be fast losing ground in favour of the legitimate government.

It is hard to believe that what is happening on the ground in both Syria and Yemen, and the related diplomatic activity in the capitals of the other concerned countries, is not substantially helped by the new climate created by the Vienna deal. 

Obviously, the war in Yemen is only few months old. But it must be politically, militarily and financially exhausting for all sides, those who are directly involved in the actual fighting and others who offer indirect support. It is not in the interest of any party to perpetuate this brutal conflict. The war in Yemen is also enhancing the rise and spread of terror all around. As matters are getting out of hand, pragmatic wisdom dictates that each side needs to revise its policies so that past political blunders can be discarded.

If that applies to the situations in Syria, Yemen and possibly Iraq, it definitely does not apply to Palestine and Israel. While the US, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and a few other state actors could play instrumental roles in convincing their local clients participating in the ongoing conflicts in ways conducive to facilitating negotiations and political solutions, it is not possible to change Israel’s intransigent position which is totally and categorically against any meaningful negotiations with its Palestinian or Arab partners. The US is the only power that can change the Israeli position. But the Obama administration is in no mood now to put that kind of pressure on Israel while the battle in Washington is whether the Congress will approve or reject the Iran deal. As Israel and its US lobby are openly and intensively campaigning against the deal, the administration needs to appease — rather than antagonise — Israel with more concessions and rewards. That is certain to cause an adverse effect by encouraging more Israeli intransigence, not less. But even if that were not the case, even if Washington was really willing to pressure Israel into compliance, the distance between the Israeli and Palestinian sides is so vast that no amount of political coercion would move Israel enough for any reasonable agreement. That is my reason for excluding this conflict from any hope, at least in the foreseeable future. For any change to happen on this front, the Palestinians need to radically revise their sterile peace strategy. The Arab states also need to do the same.