The dangerous peace in the Gulf

By Mohammad Momani, Sean Yom

This is a dangerous time to be an Arab ally of the United States. Iran has won the Gulf, and President Donald Trump’s administration does not seem to care. The dusk of American power does not bode well for Jordan and other Arab states that, for long, threw in lots with Washington.

While Iran has exercised its Middle East ambitions over the past decade in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, its Gulf aggression since last year has elicited the most alarm. Since May, Iranian forces have shot down an American drone, seized British and UAE oil tankers and had a hand in attacking a half-dozen other ships. In September, the Houthi movement claimed responsibility for attacks on Saudi oil refinery facilities that temporarily cut the Kingdom’s oil production by half. By all counts, Iran’s strategic reach is expanding at a breakneck pace.

If Iran sought to expose American temerity with these unprecedented attacks, then it has succeeded beyond its wildest dreams. Despite sending thousands of troops and a naval armada to its formidable Gulf bases, the US has done little in response apart from imposing more sanctions. Consider that under the Bush administration, the US invaded Iraq in 2003 under far fewer pretenses. Iran has crossed red lines that Saddam Hussein did not. Trump’s pullout from the Iranian nuclear deal last year elevated expectations of a more assertive policy against Tehran, but nothing has come of it.

Such American paralysis is perilous. This marks the sunset of US hegemony. That hegemony began with the 1980 Carter Doctrine, when President Jimmy Carter promised to repel any outside power in the Gulf with military force. The declaration underlay several subsequent wars and interventions waged by America; e.g. the tanker wars of the Iraq-Iran War and the Gulf War in 1991. Many suffered greatly in these conflicts, but one byproduct was a strategic alliance linking Washington with key Arab states in order to contain Iran’s revolutionary ambitions and maintain security in the region.

That security seems gone, and Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Arab allies of the US have good reasons to worry. The Trump administration’s allergy to overseas interventionism is admirable from a pacifist perspective, but it also represents illogical and conflicting behaviour that sends negative conflicting messages. The hallmark of the US presence has been the credibility of its commitment to protect Arab allies in the face of Iranian aggression. Commitments are credible only if Arab allies believe that Washington is willing to back up threats with coercive action. When US leadership constantly promises its friends that it will level Tehran yet does little in the face of Iranian provocation, the effects are enervating on several levels.

First, it encourages Arab states to seek new friends and allies, given the unreliability of Washington as a fading superpower. We already see rumblings of this. The UAE has abandoned the conflict in Yemen and opened channels to Tehran to find new arrangements. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey have engaged Russia increasingly on investment and security issues.

Second, it weakens the ability of Arab partners to advance multilateral interests on other fronts.  The US-backed “deal of the century” was going to be disastrous anyway, but now its future has become even more clouded. While Jordan has always rightly opposed this nonsensical plan, it is unlikely that the Gulf kingdoms will support this initiative too. Arab governments will not sacrifice their support for the Palestinian cause on the altar of geopolitical expediency if that tradeoff does not always make them safer.

Finally, it exposes many Arab governments to the double jeopardy of dealing with regional insecurity while also addressing social and economic problems at home. Ten years after the Arab Spring, public crowds across the region continue to clamour for change. States like Jordan are still struggling to meet their demands, but the pathway to domestic reform is not made easier when the region is upended, and increased dangers abound on the external front. 

There is no easy solution to this morass, because this problem results from 40 years of American hegemony and two years of confusing inertia under the Trump administration.  In the long term, regional order may well realign and become more multilateral. With Washington’s retreat, Russia and China may fill the geopolitical gap, creating new opportunities and hazards for regional players. In the short term, however, the US must clarify its stance. Specifically, it either must follow through on its declared coercive threats, or simply stop making them altogether, for at least the latter would give countries much-needed clarity. A superpower that promises one thing yet constantly does the opposite is the worst of both worlds.