Allies or competitors?

Through his recent visit to Tehran, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to cement his country’s partnership with Iran in Syria.

While many Western media outlets suspect that Russia will eventually use Bashar Assad as a scapegoat, Putin made it clear to the Iranian supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, that Assad was there to stay.

To be sure, this assertion resonated well with the Iranian leaders who also insisted that Assad should not be compromised for the sake of any political settlement.

The apparent agreement on Syria between Putin and his Iranian counterpart may conceal the fact that their coalition will most likely be short lived. The two sides are as much competitors as allies.

Suzanne Maloney, an analyst at the Brookings Institute, argues that “simply because they both are helping to defend Assad doesn’t mean their goals are identical or that what happens on the ground works to benefit both parties equally”.

According to Fred Hof of the Washington-based think tank Atlantic Council, Iranian leaders believe that Assad played a crucial role in helping them keep the support for Hizbollah intact.

Were it not for the Assad family, Iran would have struggled to maintain the same level of support.

The arms provided to Hizbollah gave Tehran leverage in the conflict with Israel. Thus, it would be unthinkable for Iran to simply let go its support for Assad.

Thus, the need to prop up Hizbollah in Lebanon serves as the lens through which the Iranian leaders view the crisis in Syria.

Likewise, Russia shares with Iran the objective of shoring up Assad’s regime as much as possible.

The overrun of the Assad’s forces by the rebels would have literally thrown Russia out of Syria. When Putin came to the realisation that Assad was on the verge of collapse, he rushed his country’s air force to help defend Assad’s demoralised troops.

And yet, Iran and Russia view the situation differently. Though they work together to keep Assad in the saddle, their cooperation is driven by different objectives and is characterised by a lack of mutual trust.

Unlike Iran, which views Hizbollah as the ultimate objective in its support for Assad, Russia does not really care about Hizbollah.

Putin genuinely believes that this time around his country could stand up to the American strategy in this part of the world.

Putin is taking advantage of the relative American disengagement from the Middle East to, according to Hoff, inflict a defeat on the American strategy of democratisation in the Middle East and around the world.

Obviously, Putin fears the promotion of democracy.

Confusing as it may look, Russia supports the Syrian army and seeks to work with it as long as it is needed. This sort of cooperation dates back to the old days of the Soviet Union.

However, contrary to Russia, Iran supports Hizbollah and its militias dispatched from Afghanistan and Iraq.

In brief, that Assad should remain in the saddle is an objective Russians and the Iranians agreed upon.

And yet, beyond this objective, it is hardly possible for Iran and Russia to see eye to eye on many issues in Syria.

This reality has yet to be exploited by the Western powers.

Many Western analysts assume that there are big chances to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, but thus far, it seems that this is easier said than done.

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