For sane policies in Iraq

I

n the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, successive governments used every trick in the book to manipulate Iraqis and justify their failure to effectively govern the country. 

The sectarian policies followed by these governments are responsible for the grim situation of Iraq. This time, however, Iraqi Shiites have risen up and taken to the streets to express their dissatisfaction with the systematic failure of governments to meet their basic needs. Not surprisingly, Iraqis have reached a point where even pro-government citizens could not tolerate the corruption and the government’s indifference to their basic needs, such as electricity, especially during the very hot summer.

Iraqis are talking about tens of billions of dollars wasted during the last decade.

Adding to the misery is the report released by the parliament’s security and defence committee on the fall of Mosul to Daesh last year.

The report squarely blames former prime minister Nouri Al Maliki, along with senior army commanders and key ministers. It could serve as the basis for prosecuting and perhaps indicting Maliki.

The report states that the army lacked preparedness just before the fall of Mosul and turned a blind eye to Daesh’s activities in Mosul, like collecting taxes.

The army’s corruption in Iraq is not a news flash. It is an open secret. Indeed, upon his assumption of power in September 2014, Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi learned that some 50,000 soldiers were “ghost soldiers”. They were on the roster with salaries, but did not exist in reality.

Successive Iraqi governments had one opportunity after another to build a strong army. Even with the massive aid coming from Washington, Iraqis squandered the plethora of opportunities.

The situation took a twist after the fall of Mosul. As the army was fully exposed, Iran did not stand idle by. It moved swiftly to establish Shiite militias to fight Daesh.

Now, with the American air strikes, the Shiite militias’ participation and the Kurdish peshmerga, it seems that the Iraqi army and the prime minister are losing ground.

Against this backdrop, Abadi took advantage of the report to declare war on corruption and Maliki.

The impetus created by the protest movements and the support of Ali Sistani encouraged Abadi to corner Maliki. 

It is not clear yet whether Abadi will launch an all-out war against Iran’s number one man. 

Casting aside the fight between Abadi and Maliki, and the bickering among various Shiite forces, it is hard to believe that the Iraqi government is going to unite the Iraqis in the
foreseeable future. 

From the get-go, Iraqi governments excluded Sunnis from the political game, thus creating a social and political rift that is difficult to bridge.

Were it not for the governments’ sectarian policies and their systematic targeting of Sunnis, Daesh would not have emerged in Iraq they way it did.

For Abadi to be able to rectify the situation and lay the ground for political reconciliation between Shiites and Sunni as a prerequisite for an effective means to fight Daesh, perhaps he should leave Maliki to face legal actions from civil and military courts for his role in the humiliating loss of Mosul.

Any recycling of Maliki would only send the message that the government — regardless of its composition — cannot achieve political reconciliation. 

To be sure, Abadi’s fight with the embattled Maliki is an uphill battle. The Islamic Dawa Party is evenly divided between Maliki and Abadi. It is hard to believe that Abadi can win without decisively splitting the party.

Therefore, Abadi needs to think of various ways to diversify his options. He will not be able to bring sanity to Iraqi politics and unite the country to fight Daesh until he builds bridges beyond his own disgruntled and divided sect.

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