Should Jordan join the GCC?

What would be Jordan’s gains and pains if it were to join the Gulf Cooperation Council?

Would such membership bring more advantages to Jordan than what it is already getting from its current relations with the GCC?

In 1981, the GCC was established as a defence pact by six Arabian Peninsula countries to fend off any threat from the missionary zeal of the new Islamic regime in Iran.

The Islamic revolution brought in 1979 a theocratic regime in place of the imperial and secular regime of the shah.

In the last days of president Jimmy Carter, the United States suffered a humiliating blow when its helicopter squadron was forced to land and the crew was captured while trying to rescue American hostages in Iran.

Alexander Hague, a former chief of staff and Republican president Ronald Reagan’s newly appointed foreign secretary, moved swiftly after taking office in 1981 to nudge the six Gulf countries to form a defence pact.

Incensed by this development, some Arab officials from outside the GCC described it as a “rich man’s club”.

Some Arab thinkers believed it ran contrary to Arab strategic interests and led to further Arab segmentation.

Although unsuccessful in certain respects, like in forming a monetary union, the GCC remains the most successful and viable Arab regional group.

The unabated flow of trade, investments and human beings, as well as security cooperation and political coordination are indicators of the GCC success.

With history appearing to repeat itself 34 years after GCC’s establishment, the GCC countries now feel threatened not by Iran’s vigilante zeal and enmity with the US and Europe, but by its potential friendship with the West.

The agreement reached by the P5+1 and Iran on the latter’s nuclear programme allows Iran the freedom to be more aggressive if it chooses to be so in the future.

Although four years ago the GCC summit took the decision to invite Jordan and Morocco to apply for membership, nothing tangible had happened.

Content with increased aid and loans from the richer GCC countries, Jordan did not seem enthusiastic enough to push its case through.

It is obvious that the GCC, or some enlightened strategists there, objectively believe that Jordan enhances the security profile and readiness of the GCC.

Jordan boasts at least 500,000 active and retired army and security personnel. This probably equals 35 per cent of the same demography in the GCC countries.

Moreover, Jordan, which was viewed as a buffer between GCC and both Baathist Syria and historical Palestine, could become, under a more plausible scenario, a geographical area connecting the GCC with both Syria and Palestine.

Assuming that the pessimistically realistic scenario of divided Syria materialises, southern Syria will have stronger relations with Jordan.

And the case becomes even more urgent if Jordan enhances its relations with western Iraq in case of separation or the more likely scenario of a loose federation in Iraq.

In such cases, Jordan’s theoretical population would be in the neighbourhood of 20 million people, the largest percentage of whom Sunnis. That is a great geo-strategic weight if Jordan becomes part of the GCC.

Jordan does not plan to expand geographically; it would still be in many ways 10 million people bigger, and facing a huge challenge.

The GCC can benefit a great deal from this development even if it costs it up to $50 billion.

Jordan, which has broad relations with Gulf countries in all the spheres of human endeavour, may ask why not be risk-averse and keep the current modus operandi.

Even if the GCC loses the membership of a country like Oman, if Jordan joins (I do not believe this will happen from an Omani perspective), it is still beneficial for it to enlist Jordan as a full strategic ally.

Jordan will want to see how the GCC reciprocates.

The writer, a former Royal Court chief and deputy prime minister, is a member of the Senate. He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.