Collapse of US strategies in Syria

The total collapse of all misbegotten US strategies for dealing with the conflict in Syria came last week. The first fatal blow came from Al Qaeda’s Jabhat Al Nusra which has captured the commander and 19 fighters belonging to a US-formed unit, dubbed “Division 30”, and mounted an all-out attack on the rest of its recruits who had to be extracted under US air strikes. So far, the US has managed to train and field only 57 men in this unit; one was reported to have been killed and as many as 20 wounded. Nusra added insult to injury by posting an online video of the captives and accused them of collaboration with the West. The US aim was to create a force of 1,200 — largely from among men living in Turkish refugee camps — but few men have sought to join. It is now unlikely that large numbers will volunteer.

US planners expected Nusra to welcome Division 30 as an ally in the campaign against Daesh, seen by Washington and some allies as the greater threat to regional peace and stability. Nusra explained its attack by saying it intends to eliminate Division 30 before it can become established in Syria. Nusra took the same action against earlier recruits run by the Central Intelligence Agency, The New York Times reported. The Pentagon was warned but clearly ignored the warnings.

Washington refuses to understand that Al Qaeda, to which Nusra owes fealty, seeks not only to take land in Syria and overthrow the Syrian government but also to expel Western personnel and influence from Muslim lands as well as oust the Saudi monarchy — a primary objective of Al Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden. Nusra considers US-allied armed groups even greater enemies than Daesh. Indeed, Nusra and Daesh often join forces in battle and freely exchange fighters.

The second blow came from the resignation of the mainly expatriate Syrian opposition National Coalition of the Local Coordination Co-ordination Committees (LCC), the only group in the coalition with any presence in Syria as well as some following. The LCC explained its exit by, belatedly, castigating the coalition’s alleged transformation into “blocs linked to foreign forces”. The criticism is belated because from the outset the opposition National Council/Coalition has always been a creation of foreign players. It was founded by Turkey in mid-2011, upgraded to a coalition in late 2012 by Qatar, and headed by Saudi, Qatari, and now Turkish allied leaders. The body has never had a unified policy. The coalition could not even agree on attending the January 2014 Geneva “peace” conference so some of its members took part as individuals, representing no one.

The third blow came from Ankara which agreed to participate in the US air campaign against Daesh but has, instead, focused its air strikes on Turkish Kurdish targets in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq and in southeastern Turkey. Having granted foreign fighters full freedom to travel across its territory and enabled them to cross its border into Syria, Ankara claims it is detaining Daesh supporters and recruits in Turkey but most arrests have been of Kurds suspected of backing the Turkish Workers Party (PKK) and its Syrian off-shoot.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also seeks to expel Daesh from a 100-kilometre stretch of the Syrian-Turkish border between Azaz and Jarabulus north of Aleppo and Raqqa. However, the real objective of this exclusion zone is to prevent Syrian Kurds from connecting the eastern border zone they control with the western frontier area they hold by linking Kobane to Azaz. The Kurds could then, presumably, halt the flow of fighters to Daesh, Nusra and other fundamentalist factions which still enjoy Ankara’s backing. The creation of an anti-Daesh zone could simply be a cover for maintaining a corridor for foreign fighters flowing into Syria to join Daesh and for Daesh to continue lucrative cross-border trade with Turkey.

Ankara’s conduct has prompted the Turkish daily Zaman to express doubts about the government’s commitment to the battle against Daesh, Nusra and their allies. Zaman suggests that Erdogan could be making war on the Kurds for party political rather than national reasons. His Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the largest number of seats but not a majority and, so far, has been unable win support from any of the other three parliamentary parties. Erdogan is especially angry with the Kurds because the AKP lost seats to the new liberal Democratic Party which represents Kurdish and other minority aspirations and interests. The AKP used to win a sizeable number of Kurdish votes in the southeast.

By stirring up a fresh conflict with the Kurds after a two-year ceasefire and fitful negotiations, Erdogan could be courting as a potential coalition partner the anti-Kurd National Movement Party (MHP) which came third in the June parliamentary election. Or, Ergogan could simply be trying to win votes from nationalist Turks if he cannot form a coalition and a snap election is called.

Erdogan’s weakened position has made Turkey, never a “safe” ally of the Western powers, an unpredictable player. While he pretends to have joined the US-led coalition which focuses on Daesh and, now, Nusra, Erdogan continues to be totally committed to the ouster of Syrian President Bashar Assad and has been using Daesh, Nusra and all manner of takfiri groups to achieve this end, in spite of the risk they pose to this region and to Turkey itself.