Iran unlikely to change

As the historic deal with Iran over its nuclear programme went into effect this week, a new chapter in Tehran’s relations with the world was heralded.

It is a victory for diplomacy, as President Barack Obama said, but, more importantly, it is a triumph for Iran’s moderates, or so it seems.

The deal will almost certainly reduce tensions between Iran and the international community, paving the way for normalising the Islamic republic’s relations with the West, but much rests on Tehran’s willingness to open a new page with its neighbours as well.

The lifting of nuclear-related sanctions will boost Iran’s struggling economy and will have positive effects on its citizens who, for decades, have paid a hefty price for their country’s bellicose regional policies.

The question now is will Iran’s leaders manage to make the transition from revolutionary mode to a normal state-like reality?

Sceptics believe that the religious conservative institution, which is made up of clergy and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, that has ruled Iran since the overthrow of the shah in 1979 will not give in easily.

The triumph by the reformists will not be allowed to come at the expense of the conservative institutions that have much to lose.

President Hassan Rouhani’s optimism about the future may be short lived.

Upcoming parliamentary and, more important, Assembly of Experts elections will be a litmus test of the mood of the clergy and of ailing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

While Israel insists that the nuclear agreement was a bad deal and that Iran’s hardliners will continue to pursue a belligerent policy towards Israel and Iran’s neighbours, the Obama administration believes that Iran’s opening up to the world will help the reformists at the end of the day.

The internal struggle between conservatives and reformists will continue for some time, and it is unlikely that Tehran’s regional policy will witness much change in the near future.

The recent diplomatic escalation between Saudi Arabia and Iran will further polarise the region and complicate regional crises in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

When it comes to defining Iran’s role in the region, the clerical institution seems to have the upper hand. That is why Gulf countries view with suspicion Washington’s approach towards Iran in spite of US assurances to GCC leaders.

On the ground, Iran has done little to convince its Gulf neighbours that it was ready to alter its position on Yemen, which has become a geopolitical challenge for Riyadh and its allies.

By the same token, Tehran continues to play a negative role in Iraq, fuelling sectarian confrontations and presenting itself as a guardian of the country’s Shiites.

In Syria, Iran’s military involvement prolonged the civil war and hardened the position of the regime, preventing a political transition there.

The nuclear deal will not amend Tehran’s controversial approach to regional crises or force it to review its agenda.

On the contrary, with billions of dollars now made available to the government, the conservatives will be enticed to boost Iran’s regional ambitions.

It is unlikely that Rouhani and his allies will be able to steer away from the current policy any time soon.

This was made apparent when Tehran was quick to respond to new sanctions imposed this week over its ballistic missile programme, vowing to press ahead to develop its military capabilities.

The big change in Iran will come from the Iranian people themselves.

Iran’s economy has suffered over the past decades from international sanctions, but mainly from the country’s confrontational policies in the region.

With unemployment rates reaching record levels among young men and women, it is clear that the conservatives failed to deliver on promises for a better future.

Iran’s youth will be the major force behind dramatic changes in that country.

And since the clerical institution will not give in easily, or even through the ballot box, as the experience of former president Mohammad Khatami showed, one could predict that the internal struggle may turn into an open and dangerous confrontation.

Of course, the present US policy towards Tehran may change if a Republican president is elected in November.

Ironically, while renewed US-Iran confrontation will please Tehran’s regional detractors, it could also derail attempts by moderates and reformists to reduce the influence of conservatives and stem the country’s foreign ambitions.

The coming weeks will be important in determining if Tehran’s opening up to the world will affect its current policies in the region.

There is no doubt that Rouhani, who staked his presidency on the success of the nuclear negotiations, will attempt to use the popular euphoria over the lifting of sanctions to his advantage.

But it is too early to assume that the firm grip of the ayatollahs over the country’s affairs will loosen soon.

The writer is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.